William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 3 | Issue 1

Article 12

1977

Corporations—Fiduciary Duty to
Creditors—Swanson v. Tomlinson Lumber Mills,
Inc., ___ Minn. ___, 239 N.W.2d 216 (1976)

Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
Recommended Citation
(1977) "Corporations—Fiduciary Duty to Creditors—Swanson v. Tomlinson Lumber Mills, Inc., ___ Minn. ___, 239 N.W.2d 216
(1976)," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 3: Iss. 1, Article 12.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol3/iss1/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law

et al.: Corporations—Fiduciary Duty to Creditors—Swanson v. Tomlinson Lum
19771

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

as direct damages, while crop losses and tilling costs arose as a proximate result of the breach and were validly disclaimed consequential
damages. 4 This determination seems correct, but Kleven does indicate
that the theoretically simple distinction between direct and consequential damages often can be difficult to apply in practice.35 The hazy
distinction between the two types of damages does leave the court with
some flexibility, however, especially when a valid disclaimer of consequential damages is involved. By categorizing a loss as being a direct
result of the breach, when it is arguably direct or consequential, the
court can allow the plaintiff additional recovery despite the disclaimer.
This flexibility may be useful to the court as a tool for balancing the
equities of the parties in disclaimer cases where the unconscionability
doctrine is not applicable.
Corporations-FIDUcIARY DUTY TO CREDITORS-Swanson v. Tomlinson
Lumber Mills, Inc., - Minn. -, 239 N.W.2d 216 (1976).
In the recent case of Swanson v. Tomlinson Lumber Mills, Inc., I the
Minnesota Supreme Court expanded the common law rule that preferences are voidable when given to a director of an insolvent corporation
to the detriment of corporate creditors.' Defendant Tomlinson was president and a director of several corporations, including Tomlinson Lumber Sales (Tomlinson Sales). He was also either the sole shareholder or
joint owner with members of his family of each of the corporations.
As president of Tomlinson Sales, Tomlinson executed promissory
notes totalling $209,126.26 to Burlington Northern, Inc. (Burlington),
payable December 31, 1970. The notes were not paid when due and
Burlington commenced suit on the notes on March 5, 1971. At that time,
the assets of Tomlinson Sales were composed almost entirely of accounts
receivable due from Tomlinson's other corporations. Tomlinson Sales
therefore was a creditor of the other Tomlinson corporations. For no
consideration, the current accounts receivable were converted by Tom34. 303 Minn. at 327, 227 N.W.2d at 571.
35. A comparison of two Minnesota cases suggests that the Minnesota Supreme Court
does not rely on formulas or strict definitions but responds to the particular circumstances
of each case by designing the damage recovery to meet the buyer's losses. In Barthelemy
v. Foley Elevator Co., 141 Minn. 423, 170 N.W. 513 (1919), direct damages (difference
between the value of the goods as accepted and the value of the goods if they had been as
warranted) were awarded for the failure of seed wheat to mature properly. However, in
Moorehead v. Minneapolis Seed Co., 139 Minn. 11, 165 N.W. 484 (1917), the court determined the damages where seed wheat entirely failed to germinate by using a more complex
computation involving the value of the land's use with additions (cost of seed and planting) and deductions (value of the use remaining at the time the seed failed to germinate).
Minn. -,
239 N.W.2d 216 (1976).
1. __
2. See generally 15A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§

7467-80 (rev. perm. ed. 1967).
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linson into ten-year notes on September 10, 1971, for the admitted purpose of affording the other Tomlinson corporations additional time to
arrange their financing and thereby avoid financial ruin.3
The action by Burlington was settled, judgment was entered for Burlington, the execution was returned unsatisfied, and, on May 25, 1972,
a receiver, Swanson, was appointed.4 The receiver commenced actions
against the three other Tomlinson corporations indebted to Tomlinson
Sales to liquidate the assets of Tomlinson Sales and satisfy the Burlington judgment. 5 The conversion of the current accounts receivable was
discovered by the receiver in answers to interrogatories, and he moved
for summary judgment to set aside the conversion on grounds that it was
invalid because Tomlinson exercised common control over the corporations involved.
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's finding
that Tomlinson, as president and director of Tomlinson Sales, had
breached his fiduciary duty to the creditors of Tomlinson Sales by converting the accounts and rendering the corporation unable to pay its
creditors. 6 Following prior Minnesota case law, 7 the court restated the
principle that directors and officers of an insolvent corporation, with or
without fraudulent intent, cannot grant a preference to themselves at
the expense of corporate creditors solely because of their relationship to
3. Minn. at -,
239 N.W.2d at 218. Tomlinson in an affidavit admitted the
purpose of the transaction was to afford the other Tomlinson corporations additional time
to pay their debts to Tomlinson Sales, thereby necessarily delaying payment to the creditors of Tomlinson Sales. Id.
4. MINN. STAT. § 316.05 (1976) provides for appointment of a receiver by the court when
a party has obtained a judgment against a corporation and the execution of the judgment
is returned unsatisfied.
5. The receiver in Tomlinson also sought to recover his own expenses. After the lower
court held against Tomlinson, the Burlington judgment was satisfied by Tomlinson. The
receiver, however, continued to serve as receiver after the Burlington judgment was satisfied, for the sole purpose of collecting his costs and fees. Tomlinson argued that Swanson
had no authority to maintain the action after the Burlington debt was paid. The court
held the action could be maintained, stressing that under MINN. STAT. § 316.05 (1976) the
costs and expenses of the receiver were to be paid before claims of creditors and that the
receiver is an officer of the court and therefore the court has a duty to see that the receiver
is paid. See
Minn. at __,
239 N.W.2d at 218-20.
6. Id. at -,
239 N.W.2d at 220. Concerning the duty owed by corporate officers and
directors to corporate creditors, the court observed:
The relationship between corporate officers and directors and the creditors of a
corporation is not altogether clear. While it is said that corporate officers and
directors are not trustees for corporate creditors and owe them no fiduciary duty
[citation omitted], it appears that this statement is subject to the qualification
that there be sufficient assets to pay their claims.
Id.
7. See Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. Kotz, 222 Minn. 153, 23 N.W.2d 576 (1946); Taylor v.
Fanning, 87 Minn. 52, 91 N.W. 269 (1902); Taylor v. Mitchell, 80 Minn. 492, 83 N.W. 418
(1900).
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the insolvent corporation. In Tomlinson, the transfer worked to the detriment of Burlington by rendering Tomlinson Sales unable to pay the
note to Burlington or satisfy the subsequent judgment. While the benefit to Tomlinson was indirect, the preferential transfer was for the direct
benefit of his other corporations and therefore also was for his benefit.
Although the Tomlinson court relied on well-established Minnesota
precedent, the case is unique because the precedent relied upon is designed to apply in situations where a director of a corporation also is a
corporate creditor and the director secures payment of his debt ahead
of the debts of other corporate creditors.8 In Tomlinson, however, neither
Tomlinson nor his other corporations were creditors of Tomlinson Sales,
but rather Tomlinson Sales was the creditor. Therefore, the court's ruling seems to stand for the proposition that a transfer creating an indirect
benefit to a director, not necessarily a preference over general creditors,
may be invalidated where it works to the detriment of the corporate
creditors.'
In most jurisdictions, absent state statutes0 or federal bankruptcy
proceedings," an insolvent corporation can prefer one creditor to the
detriment of others. 2 An exception to this rule, however, is where a
director who is also a corporate general creditor prefers his pre-existing
debt over those of the other general creditors of the insolvent corpora8. See note 2 supra. In each Minnesota case prior to Tomlinson, the court in applying
the common-law rule against preferences to corporate directors has done so where an
insolvent corporation was the debtor and the director or officer who received the preference
was a creditor who received a preference for an antecedent debt. See Farmers Coop. Ass'n
v. Kotz, 222 Minn. 153, 23 N.W.2d 576 (1946) (chattel mortgage given to former officerdirector); Aiken v. Timm, 147 Minn. 317, 180 N.W. 234 (1920) (conveyance of all real and
personal property of corporation to officer's wife for debt owed to both); Taylor v. Fanning,
87 Minn. 52, 91 N.W. 269 (1902) (judgment obtained by nominee of directors to whom
the notes evidencing the indebtedness had been assigned); Taylor v. Mitchell, 80 Minn.
492, 83 N.W. 418 (1900) (mortgage executed, on behalf of corporation, to board of directors
as individuals, each of whom was creditor of corporation).
9. This rule presumably is still subject to some exceptions, such as where a corporate
director is given a security interest in exchange for a contemporaneous loan to the corporation. See, e.g., Taylor v. Mitchell, 80 Minn. 492, 83 N.W. 418 (1900) (court stressed that
rule against preferences was applicable when preference was for pre-existing debt owed
by corporation to director).
10. See MINN. STAT. § 60B.32 (1976) (makes certain preferences given by insolvent
insurance companies voidable). For a compilation of federal and state statutes affecting
the common-law ability to prefer creditors, see 15A W. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at §§
7437-66.
11. See BANKRUPTCY ACT § 60, 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1970) (certain preferences given within
four months of filing of bankruptcy are voidable by trustee).
12. See, e.g., Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. Kotz, 222 Minn. 153, 23 N.W.2d 576 (1946); 15A
W. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at § 7421. But see Furber v. Williams-Flower Co., 21 S.D. 228,
111 N.W. 548 (1907) (those courts adhering to "trust fund" doctrine may reach different
result).
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tion.13 Some courts have premised this exception on the "trust fund"
doctrine, which basically provides that assets of an insolvent corporation are held in trust for the benefit of its creditors, and that consequently creditors, including director-general creditors, must share prorata the corporate assets with the other general creditors of the corporation.' Minnesota, in the leading case of Hospes v. Northwestern Manufacturing & Car Co.,' 5 decided by Mr. Justice Mitchell, soundly rejected
the trust fund doctrine as an unrealistic fiction. In its stead, the court
in Taylor v. Mitchell" adopted the approach that as an equitable principle a corporate director owes a fiduciary duty to the creditors of an
insolvent corporation which forbids him from preferring himself over
those creditors. It was this equitable principle that the court in
Tomlinson invoked to protect Burlington, the creditor of Tomlinson
Sales.
Application of the Taylor v. Mitchell line of case law, however, has
been limited in the past to cases where the director was a creditor of the
insolvent corporation," a situation only analogous to the Tomlinson
facts. The Tomlinson court's use of the Taylor v. Mitchell theory
reached an equitable result, but an alternative approach of utilizing the
fraudulent conveyances statute, which was not argued by the parties,
might have resolved the case more directly.
Fraudulent conveyances law in Minnesota is governed primarily by
the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act (U.F.C.A.),' 8 which creates
two major types of fraudulent conveyances: those constructively fraudulent'9 and those fraudulent upon a showing of intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud creditors.20 Tomlinson probably violated both provisions by
converting the current accounts receivable of Tomlinson Sales into longterm indebtedness.
To take advantage of the U.F.C.A., one must be a "creditor ' 2' and the
transaction involved must constitute a "conveyance. ' 2 The U.F.C.A.
does not specifically state that a receiver, such as Swanson, is a creditor
13. See, e.g., Taylor v. Mitchell, 80 Minn. 492, 83 N.W. 418 (1900) (defendant directors
mortgaged corporate property to themselves, then foreclosed on property).
14. See generally 15A W. FLETrCHER, supra note 2, at §§ 7369-89.
15. 48 Minn. 174, 50 N.W. 1117 (1892).
16. 80 Minn. 492, 83 N.W. 418 (1900).
17. See cases cited note 8 supra.
18. MINN. STAT. §§ 513.20-.32 (1976).
19. Id. § 513.23 (voluntary conveyance for no consideration by insolvent corporation is
constructively fraudulent).
20. Id. § 513.26.
21. The Act defines a "creditor" as "a person having any claim, whether matured or
unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, absolute, fixed or contingent." Id. § 513.20.
22. A "conveyance" is defined by the Act as including "payment of money, assignment,
release, transfer, lease, mortgage, or pledge of tangible or intangible property, and also
the creation of any lien or encumbrance." Id.
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under the Act, and an early Minnesota commentator suggested he would
not be.23 The Minnesota Supreme Court has held, however, that a receiver appointed in a proceeding subsequent to execution has equitable
power to set aside a fraudulent conveyance, and in so doing "stands in
the place of the creditor, and prosecutes the action in his behalf."" Such
a holding is consistent with the receiver's role as representative of the
creditors, and therefore Swanson probably could have utilized the Act.z
The U.F.C.A. defines a conveyance to include a "release." ' 6 In
Tomlinson, Tomlinson Sales released the other Tomlinson corporations
from their current obligations due on open account and substituted
without consideration a long-term obligation of unquestionably less
value. Because the Act's definition of conveyance is intended to be read
broadly,n the transaction in Tomlinson could quite easily have been
found to be a release of the current debts and therefore constitute a
conveyance." Consequently, the prerequisites to the application of the
U.F.C.A. probably were present in Tomlinson.
To establish constructive fraud under the U.F.C.A., a creditor must
23. See Bridgman, Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act in Minnesota (pt. 2), 7 MINN.
L. REv. 530, 538 (1923) (no authority cited for this proposition).
24. Dunham v. Byrnes, 36 Minn. 106, 108, 30 N.W. 402, 403 (1886); accord, Merrill v.
Zimmerman, 152 Minn. 333, 336, 188 N.W. 1019, 1020 (1922); see Tvedt v. Mackel, 67
Minn. 24, 69 N.W. 475 (1896); Sawyer v. Harrison, 43 Minn. 297, 45 N.W. 434 (1890). In
Healy-Owen-Hartzel Co. v. Montevideo Farmers & Merchants Elevator Co., 170 Minn.
290, 212 N.W. 455 (1927), the Minnesota Supreme Court denied appointment of a receiver
on grounds that the judgment creditor's remedies under MINN. STAT. § 513.28 (1976) were
adequate. Recognizing that courts have broad discretion in determining whether a receiver
shall be appointed, one of two implications could be drawn from Healy. First, a receiver's
powers are equal to those of the judgment creditor. Second, a receiver's powers are
broader, extraordinary powers and may not be necessary in some cases. Either would
explain the holding in Healy and both support the power of a receiver to use the Act.
25. If the receiver cannot use the Act, then he would have to revert to common-law
fraudulent conveyance law which could cause different results. Under the common-law,
a conveyance is not considered constructively fraudulent even if made by an insolvent
person for no consideration, see, e.g., Underleak v. Scott, 117 Minn. 136, 134 N.W. 731
(1912), while under the Act such conveyances are constructively fraudulent, see note 19
supra.
26. See note 22 supra.
27. See Bridgman, supra note 23, at 461; cf. Kummet v. Thielen, 210 Minn. 302, 298
N.W. 245 (1941) (purpose of Act is to prevent debtors from putting property which is
available for payment of their debts beyond reach of their creditors); Atwater v. Manchester Say. Bank, 45 Minn. 341, 48 N.W. 187 (1891) (confession of judgment may be
fraudulent conveyance).
28. A right to current payment of an amount is obviously worth more than a right to
receive that amount at a future date. See E. HmEnT,TECHNIQUES OF FINANCIAL ANLYSIS
126 (3d ed. 1972). Tomlinson is analogous to the fraudulent transfer in Hall & Farley v.
Alabama Terminal & Improvement Co., 39 So. 285 (Ala. 1905), where an insolvent corporation released solvent stock subscribers and substituted insolvent stock subscribers. In
Hall, the corporation released a debt of value for one of no value, while in Tomlinson the
corporation released a debt of some value for an obligation of considerably less value.
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prove the debtor was insolvent at the time of the conveyance and the
conveyance was not made for fair consideration.2 9 In Tomlinson, the
conveyance was made for no consideration, and therefore the only issue
would concern the insolvency of Tomlinson Sales. The opinion was not
entirely clear as to the financial status of Tomlinson Sales, stating at
one point that the corporation was not insolvent from a purely accounting viewpoint, having more assets than liabilities, but that the conversion effectively rendered it insolvent in the sense that it could not pay
its obligations as they maturedY' Consequently, the court seemed to find
that Tomlinson Sales was solvent before the conversion of the accounts
receivable but that the conversion rendered it insolvent. Therefore,
under the U.F.C.A., the conversion was constructively fraudulent."
Even if not constructively fraudulent, a conveyance can be set aside
under the U.F.C.A. without a showing of insolvency if made with intent
to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. 2 Tomlinson admitted the purpose
of the conversion was to forestall the financial demise of all the Tomlinson corporations. 3 This admission seems necessarily to imply that Tomlinson intended to delay or hinder the collection of the Burlington debt,
and the courts will presume such an intent if the conveyance has the
effect of delaying or hindering creditors . 3 Therefore, the facts of
Tomlinson could have supported a finding that the conveyance was
either constructively fraudulent or intentionally fraudulent under the
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act, as well as supporting the stated
35
basis for the court's decision.
29. See MINN. STAT. § 513.23 (1976).
30. See note 6 supra.
31. See MINN. STAT. § 513.21 (1976); Note, Application of the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act, 46 HARv. L. REv. 404, 420 (1933). See also Gipson v. Bedard, 173 Minn.
104, 217 N.W. 139 (1927) (dictum) (rejected test of insolvency as being inability to meet
one's obligations as they mature in the regular course of business without taking into
account debtor's assets).
32. See MINN. STAT. § 513.26 (1976).
33. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
34. See Greenleaf v. Edes, 2 Minn. 264 (Gil. 226) (1858); cf. Note, supra note 31, at 415
(conveyance by corporation in consideration of benefits to affiliated corporation should
be invalid).
35. Tomlinson also may have been a proper case for invocation of the piercing the
corporate veil doctrine. See, e.g., Central Motors & Supply Co. v. Brown, 219 Minn. 467,
18 N.W.2d 236 (1945) (corporation cannot be utilized to shield property from one's creditors); Matchan v. Phoenix Land Inv. Co., 159 Minn. 132, 198 N.W. 417 (1924) (commonlaw fraudulent conveyances case where several corporations were used to defraud creditors
and court pierced corporate veil). But see General Underwriters, Inc. v. Kline, 233 Minn.
345, 46 N.W.2d 794 (1951) (facts parallel those in Tomlinson; held unnecessary to pierce
the corporate veil where fraudulent conveyance is present). See generally Clark, The
Duties of the CorporateDebtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. Rv. 505 (1977) (discussion
of relationship between doctrines of equitable subordination, fraudulent conveyances, and
piercing the corporate veil).
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